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Abstract
In this paper we consider a natural generalization of standard tree games where
the underlying structure is a directed acyclic graph. We analyze the properties of
the game and illustrate its relation with other graph based cost games. We show
that although the game is not convex its core is always non-empty. Furthermore we
provide a painting algorithm for large families of directed acyclic graph games that
finds the nucleolus in polynomial time.
Keywords: Cooperative game theory, Directed acyclic graphs, Nucleolus
JEL-codes: C71
1 Introduction
Standard tree games are one of the most well-studied class of cost allocation games. In
its most basic form, we have a tree, where nodes represents players and there is a cost
function defined on the edges. There is a special node the so called root of the tree.
This node can be interpreted as the service provider. The aim of every player is to get
connected to the root. The question is how to allocate the costs that arise from the
construction of the edges. A more general problem is when the underlying structure is
considered to be a directed acyclic graph. In such a network, players can have multiple
routes to the root. Naturally, not all edges will be constructed in the end, but players
that have more than one possible way to reach the root have more bargaining power when
it comes down to sharing the cost.
∗The author thanks the funding of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences under its Momentum Pro-
gramme (LD-004/2010).
†Research was funded by OTKA grant K108383.
‡Research was funded by OTKA grant K101224.
1
Consider for example a group of towns that would like to connect themselves to a
water reserve. Clearly not every town has to build a direct pipeline to the source. A
possible solution is to connect the nearest towns with each other and then one of the
towns with the reserve. The towns that are already connected to the water system can
force the rest to pay some of their construction cost, otherwise they can close down the
outgoing water flow. On the other hand, no town can be forced to pay more than the
cost of directly connecting itself to the water reserve.
Similar problems arise frequently in real world and the corresponding game theoretical
literature is vast. Airport games, irrigation games and minimum cost spanning tree games
(MCST) are all variations of the same cost sharing problem described above [9, 12, 7].
Shortest path games, peer group games and highway games are also similar in their
concept [3, 1, 4]. Each of these games have non-empty core, which makes the nucleolus
an appealing solution for such problems1.
The nucleolus was introduced by Schmeidler in 1969 [16] and quickly became popular
although it has a reputation to be much more complicated than the Shapley-value. Indeed
it is very hard to axiomatize the nucleolus and even harder to compute it for a given
game. However, in the past few decades there has been significant progress in this second
aspect. Kuipers showed that there exists an efficient algorithm to compute the nucleolus
for convex games [11]. Meanwhile, researchers developed fast algorithms for the nucleolus
of important families of cooperative games like standard tree games, assignment games
and some special classes of minimum cost spanning tree games [14, 18, 7].
Proceeding by its definition, it would take exponential time to compute the nucleolus.
In practice, this means it is impossible to calculate it even for moderate amount of players.
While this is also true for the Shapley-value usually it is easier to implement the latter
due to the many existing axiomatization. On the other hand the axiomatization of the
nucleolus provided by Sobolev can rarely be applied [17]. Still there are many known
results that describe the general structure of this solution and these can be utilized in a
wide variety of characteristic function form games. The most comprehensive work is due
to Maschler, Shapley and Peleg [13]. They not only illustrate the geometric properties
of the nucleolus but also give a linear program that computes it. Although this program
has exponentially many inequalities (one for each coalition) it can be solved efficiently if
one knows which constrains are redundant. Huberman and later Granot, Granot and Zhu
provided methods to identify the coalitions that correspond to non-redundant constrains
[8, 6]. Another useful tool is the Kohlberg-criteria which makes it easy to decide if a given
allocation is the nucleolus or not [10]. Finally Maschler, Potters and Reijnierse developed
a so called painting algorithm that can be applied in many graph related games [14]. In
1Since the nucleolus is always in the core if the core is non-empty.
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this paper, we will employ this latter approach and define a painting algorithm to compute
the nucleolus. However the structure of the proof is different as directed acyclic graph
games - unlike standard tree games - are not convex.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the second section we introduce the game
theoretical framework used in the paper. In the third section we formally define directed
acyclic graph games. In the forth we briefly demonstrate the differences and similarities
of airport, standard tree and minimum cost spanning tree games and directed acyclic
graph games. In the fifth and sixth section we propose a network canonization process
and describe its implications. Finally in the seventh and eighth section we present the
painting algorithm and prove the it results in the nucleolus of the defined game.
2 Game theoretical framework
A cooperative cost game is an ordered pair (N, c) consisting of the player set N =
{1, 2, . . . , n} and a characteristic cost function c : 2N → R with c(∅) = 0. The value
c(S) represent how much cost coalition S must bear if they choose to act separately from
the rest of the players. Let us denote a specific cost game by Γ. A cost game is said to
be convex if its characteristic function is submodular i.e if.
c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ) + c(S ∩ T ), ∀ S, T ⊆ N.
A solution for a cost allocation game is a vector x ∈ RN . For convenience, we introduce
the following notation x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi for any S ⊆ N , and instead of x({i}) we write
simply x(i). A solution is called efficient if x(N) = c(N) and individually rational if
x(i) ≤ c(i) for all i ∈ N . The imputation set of the game X(Γ) contains efficient and
individually rational solutions, formally
X(Γ) = {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = c(N), x(i) ≤ c(i) for all i ∈ N}.
Given an allocation x ∈ RN , we define the excess of a coalition S as
exc(S, x) := c(S)− x(S).
The core of the cost allocation game C(Γ) is a set-valued solution where all the excesses
are non-negative.
C(Γ) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = c(N), x(S) ≤ c(S) for all S ⊆ N}.
Let θ(x) ∈ R2N be the excess vector that contains the 2n excess values in a non-
decreasing order. We say that a vector x ∈ Rm lexicographically precedes y ∈ Rm (denoted
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by x L y) if either x = y or there exists a number 1 ≤ j < m such that xi = yi if i ≤ j
and xj+1 < yj+1.
Definition 1. The nucleolus is the vector of allocations of a game Γ that lexicographically
maximizes θ(x) over a set X0 ⊆ RN . In other words,
N (Γ, X0) = {x ∈ X0 | θ(y) L θ(x) for all y ∈ X0}
It is well known that if X0 = X(Γ), then the nucleolus of a game is a single-valued
solution and it is in the core if the core is non-empty. Throughout the paper we assume
X0 to be the set of imputations and write N (Γ) instead of N (Γ, X(Γ)).
Proceeding by its definition it would take exponential time to compute the nucleolus
of a cooperative game, since we would have to compare the 2N dimensional excess vec-
tors with each other. In order to make this task manageable we identify the redundant
coalitions which do not play any role in this process.
Definition 2. Let ΓF = (N,F , c) be a cooperative game with coalition formation restric-
tions, where F ⊆ 2N consists of all permissible coalitions. Then F is called a characteriza-
tion set for the nucleolus of the game Γ = (N, c) with respect to X(Γ), if N (ΓF) = N (Γ).
Granot,Granot and Zhu constructed a sequential LP process whose input is a charac-
terization set and the values of the cost function for coalitions contained therein, and the
output is the nucleolus of the game [6]. They showed that if the size of the characteriza-
tion set is polynomially bounded in the total number of players, then the nucleolus of the
game can be computed in strongly polynomial time.
A collection of coalitions B ⊆ 2N is said to be balanced if there exists positive weights
λS, S ∈ B such that
∑
S∈B λSeS = eN , where eS denotes the indicator vector of coalition
S. Applying the Kholberg/Sobolev criterion [10] to the games with coalition formation
restrictions yields the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let F be a characterization set and x be an imputation of the game Γ with
C(Γ) 6= ∅. Then x = N (Γ) if and only if for all y ∈ R the collection {S ∈ F | exc(S, x) ≤
y} is balanced or empty.
For proof see [15]. Although the number of possible coalitions in an n-player game is
exponential, only a fraction of them is needed to characterize the nucleolus.
Definition 4 (Essential coalitions). Let S be a coalition, such that it can be written as a
disjoint union of S1 and S2 i.e. S = S1
.∪ S2. If for such a decomposition it is true that
cΓ(S) ≥ cΓ(S1) + cΓ(S2) then S is not an essential coalition.
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Huberman showed that if the core of the game is non-empty then the essential coali-
tions form a characterization set for the nucleolus [8]. This observation helps us to elim-
inate large inessential coalitions but not the small ones. By definition, the singleton
coalitions will always be essential in every game. Applying Huberman's definition in the
dual game we can sort out the small but inessential coalitions.
Definition 5 (Dually essential coalitions). For a given coalition S let S1 and S2 to be
such coalitions, that S1 ∩ S2 = S and S1 ∪ S2 = N . If for such a decomposition it is true
that c(S) ≥ c(S1) + c(S2)− c(N) then S is not a dually essential coalition.
In case of DAG-games, the set of dually essential coalitions will prove to be more
effective tool to determine the nucleolus.
Theorem 6. If C(Γ) 6= ∅, then the dually essential coalitions form a characterization set
for N (Γ).
A formal proof of Theorem 6 can be obtained by copying the arguments of [8], but it
also follows from [2] (see Theorem 1/iv).
3 Definition of the game
A directed acyclic graph network D is given by the following:
• G(V,E) is a directed acyclic graph, with a special node - the so called root of G,
denoted by r - such that from each other node of G there leads at least one directed
path to the root. G is considered to be a simple graph, i.e. it has no loops or parallel
edges.
• There is a cost function a(e) : E → R+ ∪ {0}, that assigns a non-negative real
number to each edge. This value is regarded as the construction cost of the edge.
• There is a player set N and a correspondence between N and the node set of G.
If player i is assigned to node p we say player i resides at p. The residents of a
subgraph T denoted by N(T ).
For a subgraph T , V (T ) denotes the node set of T . Similarly E(T ) denotes its edge
set, while Ep is used for the set of edges that goes out from node p. We call nodes
that have one outgoing edge as passages while nodes that have more outgoing edges are
junctions.
For a subgraph T we define its construction cost C(T ) as the total cost of the edges
in T i.e. C(T ) =
∑
e∈E(T ) a(e). A path whose end point is the root is called a rooted
path. A connected subgraph of G that is a union of rooted paths is called a trunk. For
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each coalition S let TS denote the set of subgraphs that have maximum number of edges
among the cheapest trunks that connects all players of S to the root. Furthermore we
say that subgraph T corresponds to the node set B if T ∈ TN(B). Throughout the paper
we will identify trunks with node sets in this sense.
The characteristic function of the cost allocation game that is associated toD is defined
as follows.
cD(S)
def
= C(T ) T ∈ TS. (1)
The definition is motivated by the fact that by leaving the grand coalition the players
of S need not to pay more than cD(S) to get connected to the root. As any member in TS
has the same construction cost cD(S) is well-defined. However any DAG-network can be
transformed in such way TN contains a single element while cD(N) remains unchanged.
As we will see the canonization of a DAG-network will play an important part in the
proof. Let us denote by ΓD the cost game that is induced by cD i.e. ΓD = (N, cD). For
convenience sake we write simply Γ instead of ΓD from now on.
4 Comparison of graph related cost games
There are many similar graph related cost games. Airport games, standard tree games,
DAG-networks, and MCST games have the same setup, namely they are based on a rooted
graph, where players - who are located on the nodes - would like to share the construction
cost of the edges. Table 1 summarizes the differences of these games, while Figure 1 shows
how they are related with each other.
Graph Edges Players/node Convexity
Airport Games chain (un)directed 0− n convex
Standrad Tree Games tree (un)directed 0− n convex
DAG-games connected DAG directed 0− n not convex
MCST Games connected undirected 1 not convex
Table 1: Comparison of graph related cost games
In case of airport games and standard tree games the edges can be considered both
directed or undirected. For both of these games the nucleolus can be computed very fast,
in O(n · log n) time [14]. On the other hand to compute the nucleolus of a MCST game
in general is NP-hard [5]. As we will see in case of large families of DAG-networks the
nucleolus can be computed in O(n3) time.
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Figure 1: Venn-diagram of graph related cost games
5 Canonization process
We say that D is in canonical form if the following properties are fulfilled.
P1 Each junction has an outgoing zero cost edge,
P2 There resides a player in each passage.
P3 Each edge is used at least by one coalition.
To transform a DAG-network into a form where P1 property is fulfilled we have
to perform the following procedure for each node p ∈ V such that |Ep| ≥ 2 and
mine∈Ep a(e) = αp > 0.
1. Introduce a new node p′ with the same edge set as p but reduce the cost of the
edges by αp.
2. Erase all the edges that goes out from p.
3. Finally introduce a new edge from p to p′ with cost αp.
This is an equivalent transformation in the sense that the construction cost of TS
unchanged for any coalition S.
If p is a passage where no player resides and p has only one ingoing edge then it can
be omitted from the network. The ingoing and outgoing edge of p can be replaced by
a single edge with an aggregated construction cost. Needless to say that this procedure
does not change the costs of the TS trunks either. If a passage has more ingoing edge then
this transformation can not be applied. Therefore the P2 property pose a restriction on
the DAG-networks that can be canonized. According to P2 there has to live at least one
player in each node that has one outgoing edge and two or more ingoing edges. In the
following we will assume that the network satisfies this property.
Finally edges not used in any of the TS subgraphs can be deleted, since they do not
affect the characteristic function. Figure 2 shows an example of the canonization process.
As we mentioned before the canonization of a DAG-network does not change the char-
acteristic function of the corresponding cost game. Although canonization also ensures
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Figure 2: A DAG-network with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4} before and after canonization
(the numbers in braces indicate the players that reside in the particular node).
that TN contains only a single element, this cannot be said in general about other trunks.
In the following we will assume that TS contains only a single trunk for any coalition
S. This can always be arranged by perturbing the positive edge costs. For convenience
we will refer to TS as this unique trunk that has maximum number of edges among the
cheapest trunks that connects all members of S to the root.
6 Some consequences of canonization and further no-
tations
For each node p the cheapest edges in Ep are called TN -edges. The name comes from the
fact that (if P2 holds) an edge is a TN -edge if and only if it is an element of E(TN). If
e, e′ ∈ Ep, e is a TN -edge and a(e′) > a(e), then e′ is called a shortcut. If there exists a
shortcut between p and q it is always cheaper than any alternative path between the two
due to P3. If e, e′ ∈ Ep are TN -edges then the construction cost of both e and e′ is zero
(this is a consequence of P1).
The subgraph associated to the grand coalition (TN) holds special importance. First
this is the graph that will be constructed in the end. All the other edges are only good
for improving the bargaining positions of certain players. Note that TN is not necessarily
a tree as it may contain some additional zero-edges. Secondly TN induces a partial order
≺ on the nodes. We say that q is a descendant of p if p can be reached from q by using
only TN -edges, we denote this by p ≺ q. In such cases we also say that p is an ancestor of
q. Node p is a direct ancestor of q if p ≺ q and there is a TN -edge between them. Nodes
that have no descendants are called leafs. The node set that contains p together with its
descendants is called a branch and denoted by Bp. A Bq branch is called a subbranch of
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Bp if q ∈ Bp.
Sometimes we are interested only in some of the descendants of p therefore we cut
off some of the subbranches of Bp. Since there can be more than one 'trimmed' branch
originating from a given node we will denote a specific branch by BQp
def
= Bp \ ∪q∈QBq
meaning we consider the node set that contains p and the descendants of p but not Q and
the descendants of Q. We say that BQp is a proper branch if deleting B
Q
p along with the
in and outgoing edges from G the root can be still reached from any node on a directed
path.
Let us illustrate the above introduced notations with some examples. Consider again
the canonized DAG-network Dc depicted in Figure 2. The only shortcut in Dc is the
one that connects node f with node d. All the other edges are TN -edges. The branch Bd
contains only one node, d since d 6≺ f (i.e. d is a leaf). Furthermore it is a proper branch as
removing d together with the in- and outgoing edges the graph remains connected. Finally
the trunk that corresponds to the node set Br \Bfc is T{1,3,4} and cDc({1, 3, 4}) = 11.
Figure 3 shows an example when the submodularity of the characteristic function is
not satisfied.
Figure 3: The supermodularity of the characteristic function
Let S = {1, 3} and T = {2, 3}, then
3 + 2 = c(S) + c(T ) < c(S ∪ T ) + c(S ∩ T ) = 4 + 2,
hence we conclude that DAG-games are indeed not convex.
Finally let p be a direct descendant of the root. Then a trunk that corresponds to
{r}∪Bp is called a base branch. Note that the excess of the coalition formed by residents of
any base branch is zero for any core allocation. This is not necessarily true after removing
some of the subbranches of a base branch. The next lemma describes the structure of the
trimmed base branches that preserve this property.
Lemma 7. Let B = {r} ∪ BQp be a proper base branch, such that for every q ∈ Q there
leads a zero edge from q to V \BQp . Then exc(N(B), x) = exc(N \N(B), x) = 0 for any
x ∈ C(ΓD).
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Proof. As any player in N \N(B) can reach the root using only TN edges the total cost
can be partitioned.
c(N) = c(N(B)) + c(N \N(B))
c(N)− x(N) = c(N(B))− x(N(B)) + c(N \N(B))− x(N \N(B))
0 = exc(N(B), x) + exc(N \N(B), x)
As the excesses are non-negative for any core allocation it follows that exc(N(B), x) =
exc(N \N(B), x) = 0.
7 The painting algorithm (PAINT )
Now we introduce a polynomial time algorithm that computes the nucleolus. The proce-
dure resembles to Maschler, Potters and Reijniers [14], but the general idea comes from
[13], where the lexicographic center of a game is reached by 'pushing hyperplanes' with
unit speed.
The following definitions will be useful. The closest common ancestor of a node set U
is the unique node p ∈ V for which is true that p  u for any u ∈ U and there is no other
q ∈ V such that q  u for any u ∈ U and either p ≺ q or p and q are not ordered. The
closest common ancestor of node set U is denoted by cca(U). Furthermore we denote by
Z(p) the node set that can be reached from node p with zero cost (therefore p ∈ Z(p)
as well).
The painting algorithm consist of cycles. Only those players are participating in the
current cycle who can not reach the root with a zero cost path. Each cycle begins with
the canonization of the network. Then we repeat the following steps.
1. One player in each passage travels to its parent node.
2. Players currently located in p start to paint all the edges that goes out from Z(p).
3. If a junction p has more than one zero-edge the players located at the junction do
not paint the TN -edges of their ancestors instead they start to paint the edges of
cca(Z(p)). They will paint however all the shortcuts that originate from any path
that connects p to cca(Z(p)).
4. Non-zero edges whose end point is a node p for which it is true that r = cca(Z(p))
are painted by +1 player, called the shadow player.
5. Players paint with unit speed i.e. when k players are painting an edge, they paint
k unit of road upon one unit of time.
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6. Stop when an edge is fully painted i.e. its cost becomes zero. Players return to their
residence.
At time ti the i
th cycle finishes. We distribute ti − ti−1 payoff among the players that
participated in the painting of this phase (where t0 = 0). The algorithm stops when the
cost of all the edges are zero. Let us denote the ith cycle by Pi. Furthermore let z be the
allocation that is produced by the algorithm.
Let us illustrate the algorithm with an example. Consider the canonized DAG-network
D depicted in Figure 4. The player-set consist of four players residing in nodes a,b, c and
e. The cheapest way to connect all the players to the root is to build the edges e1, e3, e4, e5
and e7, therefore cD(N) = 13. The only shortcuts are e2 and e6. As we will see these
edges significantly shorten the time player 3 and 4 spends with painting.
Figure 4: The painting algorithm.
At time t = 0 player 4 travels forward to the ancestor node of its residence and starts
to paint the edges outgoing from Z(d) i.e. e3 and e6. Similarly player 3 paints all the
edges that goes out from Z(c) thus e1 and e4. Player 2 travels forward to node a and
paints e1. Finally player 1 travels to the root and does nothing. However as r = cca(r)
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the edges e1 and e2 are painted by shadow players. As a result at time t = 1 the cost of e3
and e6 is reduced by one unit while the cost of e1 and e2 changes to 6 and 3 respectively.
Since e6 becomes a zero-edge the first cycle finishes and the players return to their home.
At time t = 1 player 4 travels again forth to node d. As d became a junction with
more than one outgoing zero-edge, player 4 starts the painting from the closest common
ancestor of Z(d) that is node a. Player 4 will also paint the shortcuts originating from
any path between d and a. Thus beyond e1 he will paint e2 as well. The other players
paint the same edges as in the first cycle. As a result e2 is painted by three players while
e1 is painted by four.
At time t = 2 the players finish to paint e2. Player 3 can reach the root with a
zero-cost path therefore he does not participate in the painting process anymore. The
closest common ancestor of Z(d) changes from a to r therefore player 4 travels forward
to the root and e7 is painted by a shadow player. At time t = 3 the cost of both e1 and e7
becomes zero. The only player who is participating in the remaining phase of the painting
process is player 2. At t = 5 each player is connected to the root with a zero-cost path
and the algorithm stops. The final allocation obtained this way is x = (3, 5, 2, 3). It is
easy to check (e.g. with the Kohlberg-criteria) that this is indeed the nucleolus of the cost
allocation game corresponding to ΓD.
It is also easy to see that the running time of PAINT is polynomial. Let |V | = m
and |E| = l. Then the number of operations needed to canonize the network or to run
a cycle of PAINT is a linear function of m. In every cycle at least one edge becomes
a zero-edge. Therefore PAINT stops in O(m · l) time. Which - considering that G is a
directed acyclic graph - equals to O(m3).
8 Calculating the nucleolus
In our first lemma we show that the core of a DAG-network game is never empty.
Lemma 8. C(ΓD) 6= ∅ for any DAG-network D.
Proof. Let N(p) be a set that collects the residents of node p. Define an allocation x
such that for each player i ∈ N let x(i) = a(ep)|N(p)| where i ∈ N(p) and ep is one of the
outgoing TN edges of p. It is easy to see that x is a core allocation. Let V
? ⊆ V denote
the set of nodes where at least one player resides in G.
x(N) =
∑
i∈N
x(i) =
∑
p∈V ?
|N(p)| · a(ep)|N(p)| =
∑
p∈V ?
a(ep)
Therefore x covers the construction cost of one of the cheapest outgoing edges for
each node where at least one player resides. Nodes where no player resides can only be
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junctions, which have an outgoing zero edge. It follows that x(N) = cD(N). On the other
x(S) ≤∑p∈V (TS) a(ep) ≤ C(TS) = cD(S) for any S ⊆ N .
Note that Lemma 8 holds regardless property P2 is satisfied in a given network or
not.
Now we can identify the dually essential coalitions in case of DAG-network games. A
coalition S is said to be saturated if i ∈ S whenever c(S) = c(S ∪ {i}). The closure of S
is a saturated coalition S¯ for which S ⊆ S¯, TS = TS¯. Note that S¯ is unique due to the
uniqueness of TS¯, and S = S¯ ⇐⇒ S¯ = N(V (TS)). Granot, Granot and Zhu showed that
saturated coalitions form a characterizing set for the nucleolus.
Lemma 9. In a DAG-network game dually essential coalitions are either saturated or
consist of n− 1 players.
Proof. Let S be a coalition with at most n−2 players such that S 6= S¯. Then there exists
i ∈ N \ S such that cD(S) = cD(S ∪ {i}). Let S1 := S ∪ {i} and S2 := N \ {i}. Then
S1 ∪ S2 = N and S1 ∩ S2 = S therefore we can use Definition 5 since
cD(S) ≥ cD(S1) + cD(S2)− cD(N)
cD(S) ≥ cD(S) + cD(N \ {i})− cD(N)
cD(N) ≥ cD(N \ {i})
i.e. the cost criterion of dual essentiality applies as well.
Saturated coalitions incorporate every player of the trunk on which they reside. This
leads us to the following observation.
Observation 10. Every trunk that corresponds to a saturated coalition S ⊂ N can be
obtained by deleting some proper subbranches from G. Formally
V (TS) = Br \ ∪ki=1BQipi .
Furthermore the origins of the deleted branches have non-zero TN -edges i.e. Epi = {epi}
and a(epi) > 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
The first part of the observation - that each saturated trunk can be obtained by cutting
some proper branches off from G - is trivial. The second part that these branches connect
to the trunk by a non-negative TN -edge follows from the definition of TS. Let us remind
the reader that TS is the subgraph that hasmaximum number of edges among the cheapest
trunks that connect S to the root. Therefore any node p that connects to the trunk by
a zero-edge by definition is included in TS even if no player of S resides at p.
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Figure 5: Any saturated trunk can be obtained by deleting some subbranches.
The following extension of the cost function will be useful. We define τ(Q,S) as the
cost of the edges in TS that goes out from node set Q i.e.
τ(Q,S)
def
=
∑
e∈(∪q∈QEq)∩E(TS)
a(e).
Theorem 11. The dually essential coalitions of the cost game ΓD are the coalitions with
n − 1 player and saturated coalitions whose trunks correspond to node sets of the form
Br \BUq where BUq is a proper branch with Eq = {eq} and a(eq) > 0.
Proof. We have already seen by Lemma 9 that only saturated coalitions are dually essen-
tial. By Observation 10 we know that saturated coalitions can be generated by removing
subbranches from Br. The one thing we have to prove is that coalitions that correspond
to trunks that have more missing subbranches are dually inessential. Let S be such a
coalition for which V (TS) = Br \ ∪ki=1BQipi where k ≥ 2. As D is in canonical form there
resides at least one player in each of the subbranches. Furthermore we choose a repre-
sentation of TS where the node set Qk in the branch B
Qk
pk
is either empty or a subset
of V (TS). This can always be arranged since if there is a node Qk 3 u 6∈ V (TS) then
u ∈ BQipi for some i. Now cut off u and the ancestors of u from BQipi and attach them to
BQkpk . Repeat this process till every element in Qk is in V (TS) or Qk becomes empty.
For convenience sake let us introduce the following notation B1 = ∪k−1i=1BQipi and B2 =
BQkpk . Then let S1 = N \ N(B1) and S2 = N \ N(B2). In this way S1 ∪ S2 = N and
S1 ∩ S2 = S. To prove that cD(S) ≥ cD(S1) + cD(S2) − cD(N) holds as well it is enough
to show that the following two inequalities are true.
cD(S1) ≤ cD(S) + τ(B2, N)− τ(Qk, S) (2)
cD(S2) ≤ cD(N)− τ(B2, N) + τ(Qk, S) (3)
Note that it takes at most τ(B2, N) to connect the players residing at B2 to TS. As
BQkpk is a proper branch it follows that the nodes in Qk are junctions. Since the nodes in
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Qk are direct ancestors of some nodes in B2 they are connected with zero-edges. Therefore
we can save at least τ(Qk, S) amount of cost by connecting Qk through the branch B2
and not through the edges in ∪q∈QkEq ∩ E(TS). It is possible that aside from Qk there
are other nodes that can reach the root in a cheaper way using the edges of B2, but no
nodes of V (TS) is forced to take a more expensive path. Summarizing the above findings
we gather that
cD(S1) ≤ cD(S) + τ(B2, N)− τ(Qk, S)
We can estimate cD(S2) by keeping track how the cost changes as we swift from TN
to TS2 . As N(B2) are not in S2 we can delete B2 and subtract τ(B2, N) amount of cost
from cD(N). Deleting B2 from TN only the direct descendants of B2 get disconnected.
Therefore the only nodes that are not connected to the root are Qk and their descendants.
The cost of reconnecting Qk is at most τ(Qk, S). The reason for this is that building the
exact same edges that we deleted in case of S1 are sufficient. Take any node in Qk. As
we builded ∪q∈QkEq ∩ E(TS) it has an outgoing edge. Lets say it points to a node u0. If
no player resides at u0 then it is a junction by property P2 hence it has an outgoing zero
edge that points to a node u1. As there are finite number of nodes in D eventually we will
reach a node ut where a player (j ∈ N) resides. In TN every player is connected to the
root, hence j must be connected as well unless ut ∈ Qk. The graph is acyclic therefore
ut 6= u0. Again as we builded ∪q∈QkEq ∩ E(TS) there has to be an outgoing edge from
ut. Since there are finite number of nodes in Qk eventually we will reach a node where a
player from N \N(B2) \N(Qk) resides, that is already connected to the root. Altogether
we can estimate the cost of S2 by
cD(S2) ≤ cD(N)− τ(B2, N) + τ(Qk, S).
Now adding (2) and (3) together, then subtracting cD(N) from both sides yield us the
desired result.
Theorem 12. PAINT calculates the nucleolus of the game i.e. z = N (ΓD)
Proof. Players who can reach the root with zero cost in D are dummy players. Their
contribution to any coalition is zero. The nucleolus allocates zero cost to dummy players,
but so does our algorithm. Therefore without loss of generality we can assume that in our
starting network no player resides in a node where the root can be reached with zero cost
(this is not necessarily true after P1). The proof proceeds by induction. Lets assume that
the algorithm works for canonized graphs with m nodes and at most k number of non-zero
edges (a canonized graph with m vertices can have at most m(m−1)
2
edges). Indeed if every
edge of an m-node graph is a zero-edge then z coincides with the nucleolus. Let D¯ denote
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the DAG-network that is generated after P1. For convenience sake let us write simply Γ
instead of ΓD and Γ¯ instead of ΓD¯ from now on. In D¯ the number of non-zero edges is
strictly less as in D hence our assumption holds. Therefore z = N (Γ¯) + t1 where t1 is the
|N | dimensional vector whose coordinates are t1. We need to show that z is the nucleolus
of the game.
Let E¯ be the set of dually essential coalitions in Γ¯. The next observation basically
states that during the painting some dually essential coalitions become inessential, but
this change does not occur in the opposite way. If a coalition is dually inessential it stays
so even if some of the non-zero edges in the graph are replaced with zero-edges.
Observation 13. E¯ ⊆ E
This observation immediately follows from the structure of the dually essential coali-
tions and from the description of our algorithm.
As E¯ is a characterization set of the nucleolus in Γ¯ by definition N (Γ¯E¯) = N (Γ¯).
Using Observation 13 we can also conclude that N (Γ¯E¯) = N (Γ¯E). By Theorem 3 the set
{S ∈ E|excΓ¯(S, x) ≤ y} is balanced or empty for any y ∈ R.
Let S0 denote the set of coalitions whose excess is zero for any core allocation, formally
S0 def= {S ⊆ N | c(S) = x(S) for any x ∈ C(Γ)}.
Lemma 14. During P1 TS is painted by |S| players for each S ∈ E ∩ S0 and by |S| + 1
players for each S ∈ E \ S0, thus
cD(S) = cD¯(S) + |S|t1 for any S ∈ E ∩ S0
cD(S) = cD¯(S) + (|S|+ 1)t1 for any S ∈ E \ S0
Proof. Let S ⊆ N be an arbitrary coalition. It follows from the description of the al-
gorithm that each player of S paints exactly one edge in TS. The only exceptions are
those players that travelled forward to the root in the first step of the algorithm. In those
cases a shadow player paints an edge of TS instead each of them. A trunk can be painted
however by more player than the number of its inhabitants if outside players contribute.
By Lemma 7 and Observation 10 for any S ∈ E ∩ S0 the trunk TS corresponds either
to a base branch {r}∪BQp or to its complement V \BQp , where for every q ∈ Q there leads
a zero edge from q to V \ BQp . The closest common ancestor of any q ∈ Q is therefore
the root. Hence in the first case players that reside in q or one of its ancestor nodes will
not help to paint any TN edges of {r} ∪ BQp . In the second case V \ BQp incorporates
every descendant of its own nodes except for the root, but no player resides at the root.
It follows that TS is painted by |S| players for each S ∈ E ∩ S0.
In case of S ∈ E \ S0 the trunk TS corresponds to a branch Br \BQp . By property P2
there resides at least one player in p. One player of N(p) travels forward to its ancestor
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at the first step of the algorithm. All the other players of N(BQp ) paint only edges that
goes out from BQp i.e. no edges of TS. It follows that TS is painted by |S|+ 1 players for
each S ∈ E \ S0.
It can be shown in a similar manner that the trunk of any n − 1 player coalition is
painted by n− 1 or n player depending on whether the coalition is a member S0 or not.
As a direct consequence of Lemma 14 for any S ∈ E \ S0
cD(S)− z(S) = cD¯(S) + (|S|+ 1)t1 − z(S)
excΓ(S, z) = excΓ¯(S,N (Γ¯)) + (|S|+ 1)t1 − |S|t1
excΓ(S, z) = excΓ¯(S,N (Γ¯)) + t1
excΓ(S, z) = excΓ¯(S,N (Γ¯E)) + t1
That means the non-zero excesses in ΓE with respect to z differ only by a constant
from the excesses of Γ¯E with respect to N (Γ¯E). By the same argument the coalitions
whose excess are zero for any core allocation is the same in ΓE and Γ¯E . By Theorem 3 it
follows that z is the nucleolus of ΓE . But E is a characterization set for the nucleolus in
Γ therefore
z = N (ΓE) = N (Γ)
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